The profound changes that have come about in the economic and employment sphere in Italy since the Second World War have led to significant changes in its social structure. First the process of industrialisation and then that of tertiarisation have caused, above all, a strong decrease in all levels of the farming classes, both farm owners and their workers. Until the early 1970s, there was steady growth of the working class which, although still the largest class, has seen a slowdown against the growth of the white collar middle class. In particular it is the change from a rural to industrial economy that has transformed the make-up of social classes more than the following phases of industrial consolidation and tertiarisation.
The same changes have affected Veneto, but with an intensity and speed that is beyond compare with any other Italian region. The table taken from a recent publication of the Veneto Institute for Economic and Social Research (Ires Veneto) by Anna de Angelini (Note 1) highlights the effects of the economic changes on the make-up of social classes in Veneto and in Italy. (Table 6.1.1)
In 1951, the rural origins of Veneto society were clear and the farming classes made up 40% of regional employment, higher than the national average. The higher presence of small landowners could be noted, with a lower percentage of farm workers. By the end of the 1950s, apart from a few small industrial areas, Veneto was still largely an agricultural region and far removed from the development trends affecting the regions of the industrial triangle. In those years it was one of the poorest areas in Italy and its economic backwardness drove people, especially those living in the country, to emigrate to other areas of Italy and abroad. No other region was so strongly affected by migration: the exodus affected all the smaller municipalities of the region, in particular those along the coast and in the south of the region where there was the highest number of farm workers.
In the 1960s the exodus from the country was coming to an end, starting from the areas in the centre of the region where the first steps towards industrialisation were being made, steps that were to be consolidated in the following decade. The new industrial development model was characterised by small enterprises which had rural roots. Unlike other Italian regions which in those same years were at the forefront of industrialisation, in Veneto the class of new industrial entrepreneurs developed from the rural lower middle class, rather than from the urban lower middle class.
The 1980s and the early 1990s were an important time for the economic development of Veneto. There were higher levels of growth than in most of Italy and the system of small enterprises showed its success, standing up to the crisis that affected larger enterprises. At the same time, the rise in employment prospects reversed the direction of the migration process and Veneto became a region for immigration, first calling for labour from the South and then from abroad.
The recession at the beginning of the 21st century, which affected Italy and the whole euro area, led to a rethinking of the Veneto production system, so much so that in the years of globalisation and the introduction of the single currency, enterprises reacted to the loss of competition through a large-scale process of selection and repositioning. The small enterprise changed, became assorbed by larger companies or became a more structured firm. At the same time the profile of the entrepreneur changed. Whilst before he played the part of the owner-director, unwilling to delegate company tasks, he came to feel the need to seek highly qualified personnel and services, even through outsourcing. In terms of employment, this meant the rapid development of the tertiary sector and its related ranks.
Over time, then, the social make-up has changed considerably, even though Veneto maintains certain features that distinguish it from the social make-up of Italy. It has a larger urban working class, especially in the industrial sector and in business, and relatively fewer members of the upper middle class and white collar middle class. The Veneto upper middle class is less developed, not so much because of the share of entrepreneurs, but because of the lower number of working professionals. On the other hand the particular structure of inhabited areas in Veneto, mainly small towns, has not always helped and supported the development of services and the consequent demand for tertiary professional figures of the white collar middle class that is typical of the larger cities.

Changes in the labour market are at the heart of social-ladder climbing and mobility processes. In particular, the growing demand for more qualified professionals, especially in services, has created new opportunities, which even the children of the lower social classes have benefited from.
Flows between social classes have been estimated by studies of social mobility-the process by which people move up a rung on the social ladder during their lives (intragenerational mobility) or from one generation to another (intergenerational mobility). Apart from mobility that can be attributed to structural changes in socio-economic contexts, studies can help understand whether opportunities for moving up the ladder are equally distributed, that is whether they are accessible and guaranteed for everybody no matter what their social class of origin is. The first aspect concerns measures of absolute mobility, the second, relative mobility. With reference to the latter, the measure of social mobility indicates the degree of equality and openness, defining as mobile those societies which guarantee equal opportunities for improvement to everybody, aiding those from the lower classes.

Various studies on social mobility highlight notable differences from one country to another in terms of both absolute and relative mobility, that is whether there are equal opportunities for growth or whether social origin still influences possibilities for education, professional progress, and personal success in general.
For example, if the highest paid jobs are considered, in all European countries the children of managers, professionals and technicians have a far better chance of reaching the same professional status as their fathers, on average double the chance compared to their peers whose fathers have a different job. This can be seen in particular in Southern and Eastern European countries, where there is a strong link between a father's qualifications and those of his children. In Italy the relation between the job of a father and his children is slightly stronger than the European average. Northern European countries, on the other hand, have higher levels of social mobility as there are fewer obstacles that impede entry to the most prestigious professions.
Apart from a few cases, the relation is in general stronger where sons are concerned, as they benefit more from their father's professional success, often inheriting their jobs. On the other hand, in some Central and Northern European countries, such as Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Germany, women seem to enjoy the same professional opportunities as men, reaching an equal professional status to that of their father. (Figure 6.1.1)
A person's job contributes to determining both their social status and level of financial welfare. Below are the results of a recent publication by OECD (Note 2) on the elasticity of intergenerational income, that is the strength of the connection between a father's income and that of his children.
Income elasticity can reflect the effect of mobility across social classes and take on maximum values, close to 1, when the son or daughter's income depends totally, or almost totally, on the parent's. This is a sign that opportunities for social growth and advancement are strongly influenced by family origin and are therefore not the same for everybody. On the other hand, the indicator is void when the father's income does not influence that of his children in the slightest, in this case there is maximum intergenerational mobility.
The data confirms that in Italy there is limited social mobility, especially when compared with the situation in Northern European countries. The estimate of income elasticity is 0.48, while for Northern European countries, except Sweden, it is lower than 0.2. Canada and Australia, also have high levels of social mobility, unlike the United States where the family's origins still have a strong influence. The data seem, therefore, to contradict the widespread idea that the United States is the land of great opportunity. It can be hypothesised that the low mobility in American society can partly be attributed to its strong ethnic heterogeneity, in that despite increasing social integration, in many fields, white families still have greater privileges than others. (Figure 6.1.2)

Data gathered by Istat as part of the 2003 multipurpose survey "Family and social subjects" can be referred to for a detailed analysis of national and regional social mobility. This can be used to compare the social class reached by each subject with the family's class.
Social classes are defined according to the subject's job, taking into account the kind of work, level of specialisation and competence, qualification and economic sector. For social class of origin, Istat refers to the father's position when each subject was 14-years-old. Six social classes have been identified: upper middle class, white collar middle class, urban lower middle class, rural lower middle class, and working class which is also divided into urban and rural (Note 3). There is clearly a hierarchical relation between some classes, as between the working class, the middle class (owners of small entrepreneurs, traders, craftsmen, white-collar workers or teachers) and the upper middle class. Others, on the other hand, are placed hierarchically on the same level, with the only differences being the type of job: the white collar middle class is considered on the same level as the urban or rural middle class, as the urban working class is on the same level as the rural working class.
The comparison between the social class of parents and that reached by their children helps estimate absolute mobility, that is mobility from one generation to another, which can then be divided into intergenerational mobility and intragenerational mobility. The first concerns individual movement between the social position of the family and the son or daughter's first job. The second, also known as career mobility, studies movement from the first job to following ones.
The measures of mobility shown below also reflect the effects brought about by deep structural changes in the economic-employment context. To understand better whether over time there is more or less inequality in opportunities for social mobility regardless of structural change, see the paragraph on relative mobility. What is more, with reference to people in employment aged 18-64, the data includes stories of different generations that have lived through different periods and witnessed various economic changes. Because this was a sample survey, however, it is not possible to carry out a deeper detailed analysis by cohort at a regional level.
Social origin seems to condition the opportunities available to a person at the beginning of their working life. When they enter the job market, in Italy around 4 out of 10 people take on positions that are equal or similar to that of their fathers, that is they stay in the same socio-occupational class of origin. In some cases, from one generation to the next, the same job is handed on or, more generally, a child seems to inherit the advantages and disadvantages of their father's job. Over time, however, opportunities for social mobility have been increasing and in five years the rate of intergenerational mobility has risen by almost three percentage points (60% compared to 57% in 1998). (Figure 6.1.3)
However, only 20% of young people manage to enter a higher social class from the start. Rather there is a downward mobility (in 25% of cases), that is when people begin with a job of a lower rank. This is partly obvious, given that comparison is being made with a first job against that of a father of a certain age who is more or less at the peak of his career.
The higher share of downward flow compared to upward flow for a first job does not mean that young people do not have the chance to move towards a higher class. This, however, happens later, especially through working up a career ladder, that is in terms of intragenerational mobility (24% of workers in Italy).
The comparison between the socio-occupational position of a father and that reached by his son or daughter after years in employment (Note 4) helps estimate the combined effect of these two components of mobility, that is how far social origin conditions a first job and career opportunities, known as absolute mobility. In this case, the jobs of sons and daughters are a little less similar to those of their fathers.
Compared to estimates at the time of entering employment for the first time, the rate of social immobility falls to 36% while upward mobility rises to around 30%. The latter is one of the most significant and representative measurements as it refers to those who manage to climb the social ladder.
Descents to lower classes account for around 17%, while horizontal mobility (16%) remains largely unchanged (Note 5).
In terms of absolute mobility, there are no big differences across the regions of Italy. The rate for total mobility, including all movements from one class to another, of higher, lower or equal level, is on the whole identical, even though the north-west regions have a higher tendency for upward mobility, while the tendency in the North-East is for downward mobility. Considering, however, the various components of social mobility, different models and trends can be seen at a regional level. The southern regions have higher intergenerational mobility, even upward mobility, that is young people starting their first jobs and going straight in at a higher level than their fathers. On the other hand, in the North social origin is more conditioning when people enter employment and therefore there is a closer association between a father's occupation and his son's or his daughter's first job. However, there are significantly more opportunities for progression over one's working life (upward intragenerational mobility) for workers in northern regions, which evens out the disadvantage they face when entering the job market. (Figure 6.1.4)
Veneto society generally reflects the model for the North East and compared to the rest of the country it distinguishes itself for the intensity of mobility rather than for the type and direction of movements, especially when entering the job market. Young people from Veneto generally start work in a lower position than that of their fathers (around 29% as opposed to 25% for Italy). A significantly lower number start work at a higher level (15% as opposed to 20% at a national level). This can be explained by the particular production system in Veneto, which is characterised by smaller companies than the national average, by a strong concentration of the industrial sector, and therefore of factory work, and by less development in the service sector, which accounts for the smaller white collar middle class, especially in public administration. (Table 6.1.2)
Downward intergenerational mobility concerns movements from the middle classes in particular, or even higher classes, towards the urban working class. This is more widespread and evident in Veneto than in other regions (affecting around 42% of young people from non working-class Veneto families as opposed to 33% at a national level). A high percentage of children from other social classes move into the urban working class, in particular around 29% of Veneto's upper middle class; 37% of the white collar middle class; and 50% of the lower middle class, in particular the rural one, that is the children of the owners of small enterprises. This is mainly a rite of passage, a kind of social apprenticeship during which young people spend a bit of time in a lower position to gain resources and experience before taking on the same position as their fathers. The children of entrepreneurs in particular, especially ones whose fathers have small enterprises, work in a factory for a few years before taking their father's position at the head of the family business.
The tendency towards mobility depends on social class; those who appear to be more constrained by their social class are the children of working-class parents, followed by those from a white collar middle class background. In Veneto 7 out of 10 manual labourers' children also start work as manual labourers. Around 1 in 3 manage to move up into a better position, thereby climbing the social ladder. Therefore on the whole, even after years of work, almost half the children of manual labourers are stationary from a social point of view and continue to do the same kind of work.
Even the white collar middle class is relatively immobile and has always been characterised by the low number of people leaving it (for Veneto and for Italy the rate of both absolute and intergenerational immobility is around 50%). At the same time it is open to new entries from all the other classes. In fact over recent decades there has been a major expansion in the middle classes, which are the almost exclusive destination for upward mobility from the working classes or, on the other hand, a step down for those leaving the upper middle class who have been unable to keep their own rank.
As far as mobility across different classes is concerned, the majority regards movements between adjacent classes. The flow into the white collar middle class mainly comes from the urban middle and upper classes, while the urban working class takes on the children from the lower middle class, and especially from the rural working class. The latter in particular have considerable problems and numerous obstacles in moving to classes other than the urban working class, even towards the middle class.
On the whole there are few movements towards the upper middle class, the highest class. (Table 6.1.3)
Some features of Veneto society distinguish it not only from the north-western regions, which have a different model of industrial and occupational development, but also from the regions of Central Italy, the other large area for small enterprises (Note 6). Compared to both these areas, the Veneto working class, both urban and rural, is more rigid and closed, just as there are fewer upward movements from this class to higher ones. The upper middle class, on the other hand, is less stable, as exchanges between the highest class and the other classes are more intense than in other regions. Finally the white collar middle class has a lower rate of upward mobility, while the rate for the lower middle classes is higher. As mentioned before, this is caused by the different industrial structure. As for all areas with small enterprises, the self-employed have more opportunity for career progression than elsewhere, while this is less common within large private and public organisations and therefore for employees.

Whatever the family's class, including the upper middle class, the main destination for women is the office, where 40% of Veneto women find a job as opposed to 21% of men. Whether this is an advantage or disadvantage for women depends on their origin. Even many daughters of directors, entrepreneurs and the self-employed today work in the service sector, especially in public services.
There are certainly fewer women than men in the upper middle class and the urban lower middle class. In fact if a son is more likely to work in industry or inherit his father's company, families encourage their daughters to prolong their studies both as an investment for mobility through marriage and to enter a career in the service sector in a white collar middle class position. The considerably quick rise in the level of education of women has enabled them in just a few years to catch up with the competitive and occupational advantages held by men.
The differences between genders lie above all in the rate of horizontal mobility, which is higher for women and caused by the notable flow of women from the two lower middle classes towards the white collar middle class. These are mainly women with a secondary-school education who become employees, leaving the family company to be run by the men. What is more, when starting their first job women have higher mobility than men as on average they have a higher level of education. Their initial position, however, tends to remain the same throughout their working life.
Finally, compared to the national context, there is a lower rate of upward mobility for women, due to the high number of Veneto women in manual labour. (Figure 6.1.5)

Social inequalities have not prevented many from climbing the rungs of the social ladder to reach a higher position than their parents. In any case it is reasonable to wonder how much of this mobility is the natural consequence of changes in the economic system, which have increased the number of jobs in certain sectors, and how much, on the other hand, can be interpreted as a measure both of society's openness towards social advancement and of the ability of individuals to seize opportunities for growth by investing in their own human capital.Considering this, analysis of the process of social mobility cannot only consider absolute mobility, as this measurement does not eliminate the structural effects that have come about over time due to changes in the employment system. To establish whether a society ensures equal opportunities to all its members, regardless of their social class of origin, it is necessary to consider the relations between a father's social class and the destination class of his children, aside from structural effects.
The real level of social mobility comes from relative mobility, which is measured by comparing the probability that people from two different social groups have of reaching a given destination class (Note 7). In a truly open society which guarantees equal opportunities for mobility for everybody, these probabilities should be the same for all classes of origin.
In situations where the social class of father and child are completely independent of each other, the index of relative mobility is equal to one, while the values gradually rise where the class of origin enjoys a greater innate advantage. Values between zero and one, on the other hand, indicate that the class of origin prevents movement to another class. (Table 6.1.4)
The matrix for relative mobility shown here highlights the probability that a child will maintain the same condition as his or her father on the main diagonal, while above and below represent upward and downward mobility respectively. Italian society still appears to be rather immobile, as can be seen from all the values that are higher than one and relatively high on the diagonal. Veneto, although following this tendency, has greater social mobility (Note 8) in that its people have a higher chance of moving to a different class. In particular Veneto's upper middle class appears to be more mobile. In fact, compared to their peers in lower classes, the children of upper middle class families have more than triple (3.74) the probability of staying at the top of the social scale, while at a national level this advantage is more than double (6.75).
The Veneto upper middle class is a destination for the urban middle classes, especially for the lower middle classes (2.05) and mainly flows towards the white collar middle class (1.34), showing that there is a fair degree of mobility between these social categories.
In Veneto, compared to the other classes, children from the urban lower middle class have on average double the possibility of rising to a higher class. This is also a result of the particular production structure of Veneto, where there are many small enterprises and self-employed workers which, by expanding their business, guarantee their children better social and economic conditions. Even the children of white-collar workers can count on this advantage (1.55), though less so than the urban lower middle class (2.05). On a national level, on the other hand, it is the children of the white collar middle class who have more chances of moving up towards the upper middle class (3.03), which is due to the different social relevance of the tertiary sector in Veneto. (Figure 6.1.6)
Children from the lower classes find it more difficult to climb the social pyramid: in particular, as in Italy, the heirs of the rural farming classes are disadvantaged when it comes to moving up to the middle and upper classes, while the children of the urban working class seem to have more chance of moving into the urban middle classes. However, most of them continue to work as manual labourers, fuelling the new working class along with the children of those from the rural working class. The living conditions of working-class families in Veneto, thanks to their mainly rural origins, are better than in other equally industrialised regions, where the working class lives mainly in the suburbs of large cities. This is why being a factory worker or becoming one is not seen as a move down the social ladder in Veneto.

Education has a fundamental role to play in the mechanisms of social mobility. On one hand it provides a means for social improvement as having a good qualification, such as a degree, can help open the doors to the most prestigious professions; on the other, education opportunities are strongly influenced by the individual's starting point, i.e. their social background.
A person's social background determines their educational career from high school on. It also has an effect on their success at school and their future job opportunities. Students from higher classes, i.e. children whose parents are better educated, are more likely to enrol in a lyceum and then go to university, even obtaining better results during their academic career. They grow up in a family context that is richer and more stimulating, are motivated to study by more attentive, educated parents and the family's economic possibilities give them access to a better education. There is also the wider, more privileged family network of relatives, friends, acquaintances and parents' colleagues, which offers greater opportunities to enter the labour market.
On the contrary, students from more modest backgrounds still prefer to go to a technical or vocational school, which allows them to enter the job market as soon as they leave school. For them, the opportunity-cost of years of university education is higher, so much so that they may view it as a risky investment.
This is how the socio-cultural context of the family, which is closely related to the parents' level of education, contributes to social inequality from one generation to the next.
Therefore, despite reforms aimed at liberalising access to university and at ensuring that university is no longer for the elite, higher education still does not fully contribute to upward mobility, as can be seen from various studies (Note 9).
In Italy there has undoubtedly been a rise in the general level of education, even though the number of graduates is still below average for the EU and the other most developed countries. In Veneto, the percentage of graduates is lower still because of the low demand from the region's production structure, which is essentially based on small enterprises.
At the same time the social origins of graduates have been gradually opening and, as can be seen in data from AlmaLaurea, Italy's interuniversity consortium, even in recent years the share of graduates from the upper middle class has decreased notably (by around 16%, falling from 38.6% in 2000 to 22.6% in 2006), while the number of students from the middle classes (up by 3.4%) and working classes (up by over 7%) has increased. What is more, in 2007, around 74 out of 100 graduates in Italy, and 75 in Veneto, were the first to graduate in their families.
However the path towards greater equality of opportunities has only been partially completed and social origin still heavily conditions whether a person goes to university, and to certain faculties especially, as can be seen from the comparison between the families of graduates and the rest of the population. For example, in Veneto in 2007 28.2% of graduates were from the upper middle class, which makes up only 7.4% of the total population (Note 10). Overall 20% of their fathers and 12% of their mothers also have a degree, while out of the total population of the same age (45-69 years), 7.8% of men and 5.5% of women have a degree. And the situation in Italy is not so different. This explains how the son or daughter of a father who has a degree has seven times the probability of graduating than the son or daughter of a parent with only compulsory schooling, a much higher advantage compared to the average in the 25 Member States of the European Union (3.6). (Figure 6.1.7)
Social origin does not only influence the possibility of graduating as it also seems to affect choice of course. Children of factory workers tend to prefer courses without compulsory attendance, allowing them to work to pay their way through university. On the other hand, the degrees chosen by upper middle class students require more commitment and take longer, with further periods for post-graduate courses or work experience before they can enter their chosen profession. Indeed these families have the financial resources to support their children at university for as long as it takes. This is especially the case with degrees in medicine and, to a lesser extent, in law. For example, in Veneto over half the graduates in medicine are from the upper middle class, while only 13% are from the working class. (Figure 6.1.8)
A closer look at the data reveals that apart from a generic correspondence between parents' level of education and that of their children, certain degree courses seem to be hereditary, especially the ones that lead to self-employment. The father's degree seems to be more conditioning than the mother's, especially in the case of male children. A total of 31% of Veneto graduates take the same degree as their father (26% on a national level), a figure which rises to 35% if only the degrees of sons are taken into account (31% for Italy). All things considered, it is only natural to think that the son of a lawyer, an engineer or a doctor may be attracted by continuing in his father's footsteps.
Family origin, then, has a strong influence on the future of graduates, even when they have finished university, as it affects not only their chances of finding a job, but also their income and job satisfaction.
The financial support that wealthy families can give their children accounts for the lower motivation that upper middle class graduates have to find a job as soon as they finish university. Many prefer to invest in further education to gain better qualifications. Therefore one year after graduating, 56% of upper middle class graduates are in employment, whilst the figure for all graduates is 63.9%. A total of 32% are not yet seeking employment. On the contrary, 70% of graduates from the middle classes, children of the many owners of small enterprises, are in employment within a year of graduation, perhaps because they are inspired by their family background. Only 17% of these graduates are not seeking employment.
Once they have found a job, however, graduates from the higher classes who started out from a more favourable situation, manage to maintain this advantage in terms of income and success in their professional career. Five years after graduating they earn around 1,460 euro after tax, 8.3% more than the average for graduates and 14% more than children from lower classes at the same point in their working life. The difference can only partly be accounted for by the kind of degree obtained. It is true that upper middle class graduates choose degrees that lead to higher income professions, however there are differences in salaries within the same type of degree. The most notable pay gaps concern graduates in law in particular, while other kinds of degrees, such as political science, psychology, engineering and architecture lead to lower differences.
Finally, 41.8% of the children of directors, entrepreneurs or the self-employed, at only five years from graduating, have reached top positions with high levels of responsibility, such as those of their parents; this figure is higher than that for other graduates, which stands at 34.4%.

A special section has to be devoted to the foreigners (Note 11) in regular employment in Italy. Despite often having a considerable educational background, they find it more difficult than Italians to stand out in society and for some of them the social ladder is extremely arduous.
Despite the high rate of employment among immigrants, most of them are in low positions with poor career opportunities, despite their potential and level of education. Even though many foreigners have problems getting their qualifications recognised in Italy, this does not explain the widespread process of dequalification which affects many foreign workers, even the more educated ones.
On the whole, foreign residents have reasonably high levels of education, similar to those of Italians. This can be explained by the self-selecting processes that characterise migratory flows, the relatively more enterprising, more educated people being the ones who emigrate to find new and better opportunities. This situation gives rise to phenomena that many academics refer to as brain drain and brain waste, in the sense that the exodus of highly educated people weakens the socio-cultural fabric of their countries, depriving the nation of the best human resources. At the same time, there is a waste of brain power in the destination societies (Note 12).
In Italy in 2007, almost half the foreigners aged between 15 and 64 had a degree or a school-leaving certificate, which is not that much lower than the figure for Italians (around 51%). In Veneto foreigners are actually more educated, thanks to the high number with a school-leaving certificate and a significantly lower percentage of people who have only completed primary school. Indeed the more educated foreigners are attracted by the better job prospects in general in the northern regions and the hope to find a more highly qualified job worthy of their qualifications. (Table 6.1.5)
However, the distribution of workers according to their qualification in a profession shows a type of dual labour market, which is clearly disadvantageous for foreigners. In Veneto, in line with the national figure, almost three out of four foreigners are manual labourers or white collar workers in positions that do not require qualifications (Note 13), while not even 10% manage to enter professions that require higher competences. These people include owners of small enterprises, shop-, bar- and restaurant-owners and managers, nurses, teachers and translators.
Entrepreneurship can provide immigrants with an opportunity not only to earn a higher wage, but also a chance to break free from a position of working for someone else, especially if this is socially as well as financially dissatisfying. In 2008 6.3% of entrepreneurs in Veneto were foreign, a figure that has constantly been rising since the beginning of the decade, as has the recent phenomenon of foreign female entrepreneurs (6 out of every 100 female entrepreneurs).
Both men and women are affected by professional dequalification, though in different ways. If 60% of men in employment in Italy and as many as 70% in Veneto are manual labourers, immigrant women occupy an even lower level of the job market, that of domestic employment and care for the elderly. (Figure 6.1.9)
An analysis of the employment of foreigners by their qualifications shows an even more marked imbalance when compared with their Italian counterparts. In Veneto, a university degree guarantees a qualified job to over 87% of Italian graduates in employment, but this top level of education does not do the same for foreigners. A total of 29% of foreign graduates in employment work in manual labour, as opposed to the 17.6% average in Italy. Naturally the lower the level of education required for a job, the higher the number of foreigners in these sectors of the job market. Almost the whole foreign population has a job that requires at most a lower secondary school qualification.
The gap between potential and the modest positions left for foreigners, apart from being a basis for considerable occupational hardship, is also a great waste of opportunity for growth for society and the local economy. And in a society like Italy, where a family's social class seems to count more than potential and where inequality tends to be passed from one generation to the next, foreigners have to face a further obstacle: their origin, which impedes and limits their prospects for social and economic growth.

The parents of the many immigrant children in Italy hope they will have a better future. These children also have higher expectations, as they are more integrated, they have been in Veneto for longer or were even born here.
In Veneto, one in seven foreign citizens was born here. They are the second generation of immigrants, mainly composed of minors who, compared to the first generation, have new and different characteristics and lifestyles. They are the children of foreigners who have settled in Veneto, mix with Italian peers and soak up local culture, but whose background is made up of the values and customs of their parents' country of origin. The biggest challenge for the cohesion of foreigners with Italy's social system lies with these children, whose social levers are school, work and occasions to cultivate interpersonal relations. This depends on their host environment and on future integration policy, if this aims to create a bridge between cultures. It is highly likely that the children of Italians born in America feel American. It would be interesting to see how children of immigrants in Italy would respond.
School plays a fundamental role in this respect. This is where the human capital of each individual is constructed, and this is more so for the children of immigrants who, through their relationships with peers and the challenge of learning, lay the foundations for future integration and for success in the labour market. School, with its wider vision of education and socialising, should be able to bridge the initial deficit of the children of foreigners.
In particular, important indicators that show the effects of this investment are the ability to finish school, the results obtained and the acquisition of adequate language competence.
According to the study GEN2ITA (Note 14), an analysis of the performance at school of foreign children resident in Veneto paints a picture of even greater inequality. Even though school results improve the longer foreigners have been in Italy, there are still considerable differences compared to their Italian peers. Almost one third of Veneto students of Italian origin, but only 13.2% of foreign students, gained the two highest scores for their third year of lower secondary school in the 2005/2006 school year. A total of 36.4% of Italians, but as many as 62.6% of foreigners, gained the lowest acceptable pass mark. The number of foreigners who failed (6.4%) was almost double that of the Italians (3.1%).
As far as language is concerned, over 60% of both Italians and foreigners claim they prefer to communicate in Italian, which indicates that at least this aspect of school life manages to bridge the gap between the two groups, though it is not sufficient to obtain equal levels of academic ability.
Poor school results are certainly not an indicator of lower levels of intelligence in foreigners, but may reflect economic and linguistic disadvantages of the family of origin, which therefore will be an impediment to their social mobility as adults. Parents in general make three types of resources available to their children to get them ready for social competition: economic, cultural and social. The first depend on the father's profession, the second on the parents' education and the family's level of culture, the third on the parents' network of social relations. As well as social success, these aspects are echoed in expectations for the future. (Figure 6.1.10)
Compared to Italian peers, many foreign children come from families with medium-low financial levels. This can be seen in the father's profession: over 70% have a low-level job (builder, blue-collar worker or non-qualified job). A total of 44.7% of Italian fathers, but only 12.3% of immigrant fathers, have better jobs, also at a financial level (entrepreneurs, white-collar workers, technicians, and those working in business and services).
This initial disadvantage is linked to the lower cultural level of foreign families, which also accounts for their lower performance at school. This socio-cultural origin, however, does not prevent children of foreign origin from dreaming about the future. their expectations are very similar to their Italian peers, a sign of their desire for advancement and integration in this new social context. They are not lacking in faith either, as 9 young immigrants out of 10 believe they have a good or fair chance of achieving their aims. Their lower results at school, however, indicate that they have greater objective difficulties. In any case, this does not necessarily mean a slide towards the bottom of the social pyramid since as long as the production system in Veneto is rooted in the manufacturing sector, many craftsmen and skilled manual workers will be able to obtain a good income and a dignified social level even without any particularly high qualifications (Note 15).